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Abstract
The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in many economics elds such as
game theory, mechanism design and auction theory etc. In this paper, I construct
an example to show that a social choice function which can be implemented in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium by an indirect mechanism cannot be implemented by a
direct mechanism. The key point is that agents pay cost in the indirect mechanism,
but pay nothing in the direct mechanism. As a result, the revelation principle does
not hold at all.
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1 Introduction
The revelation principle plays an important role in microeconomics theory and
has been applied to many other elds such as auction theory, game theory etc.
According to the wide-spread textbook given by Mas-Colell, Whinston and
Green (Page 884, Line 24 [1]): \The implication of the revelation principle is
... to identify the set of implementable social choice functions, we need only
identify those that are truthfully implementable." Related denitions about
the revelation principle can be seen in Appendix, which are cited from Section
23.B and 23.D of MWG's textbook[1].
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However, in this paper, I will construct a simple labor model to show the
revelation principle does not hold at all. Section 2 is the main part of this
paper, and Section 3 draws conclusions.
2 A labor model
Here we consider a simple labor model which uses some ideas from the rst-
price sealed auction model in Example 23.B.5 [1] and the signaling model in
Section 13.C [1]. There are one rm and two workers. The rm wants to hire
a worker, and two workers compete for this job oer. Worker 1 and Worker
2 dier in the number of units of output they produce if hired by the rm,
which is denoted by productivity type.
For simplicity, we make the following assumptions:
1) The possible productivity types of two workers are: 1; 2 2 fL; Hg, where
H > L > 0. Each worker's productivity is a random variable chosen inde-
pendently, and is private information for each worker.
2) Before confronting the rm, each worker i = 1; 2 can get some education.
The possible levels of education are: eL and eH , where eH > eL > 0. Each
worker's education is observable to the rm. Education does nothing for a
worker's productivity.
3) The cost of obtaining education level e for a worker of some type  is giv-
en by a function c(e; ) = e=. That is, the cost of education is lower for a
high-productivity worker.
The model's outcome can be represented by a vector (y1; y2), where yi denotes
the probability that worker i gets the job oer. Recall that the rm does not
know the exact productivity types of two workers, but its aim is to hire a
worker with productivity as high as possible. This aim can be represented by
a social choice function f(~) = (y1(~); y2(~)), in which ~ = (1; 2),
y1(~) =
8>><>>:
1; if1 > 2
0:5; if1 = 2
0; if1 < 2
; y2(~) =
8>><>>:
1; if1 < 2
0:5; if1 = 2
0; if1 > 2
(1)
In order to implement the above f(~), the rm designs an indirect mechanism
  = (S1; S2; g) as follows:
1) A random move of nature determines the productivity of workers: 1; 2 2
fL; Hg.
2) Conditional on his type i, each worker i = 1; 2 chooses his education level
as a bid bi : fL; Hg ! feL; eHg. The strategy set Si is the set of all possible
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bids bi(i), and the outcome function g is dened as:
g(b1; b2) = (p1; p2) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); ifb1 > b2
(0:5; 0:5); ifb1 = b2
(0; 1); ifb1 < b2
(2)
where (1; 0) means worker 1 gets the oer, (0; 1) means worker 2 gets the
oer; (0:5; 0:5) means that each worker has the same probability 0.5 to be the
winner.
Let u0 be the utility of the rm, and u1; u2 be the utilities of worker 1; 2
respectively, then u0(b1; b2) = p11 + p22   w, and for i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j,
ui(bi; bj; i) =
8>><>>:
w   bi=i; ifbi > bj
0:5w   bi=i; ifbi = bj
 bi=i; ifbi < bj
(3)
Proposition 1: The social choice function f(~) can be implemented by the
indirect mechanism   in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider a separating strategy, i:e:, workers with dierent productivity
types choose dierent education levels,
b1(1) =
8<:eH ; if1 = HeL; if1 = L ; b2(2) =
8<:eH ; if2 = HeL; if2 = L : (4)
Now let us check whether this separating strategy yields a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Assume bj(j) takes this form, i:e:,
bj(j) =
8<:eH ; ifj = HeL; ifj = L ; (5)
then consider worker i's problem (i 6= j). For each i 2 fL; Hg, worker i
solves the maximization problem maxbi h(bi; i), where by Eq (3) the object
function is
h(bi; i) = (w bi=i)P (bi > bj(j))+(0:5w bi=i)P (bi = bj(j)) (bi=i)P (bi < bj(j))
(6)
We discuss this maximization problem in four dierent cases:
1) Suppose i = j = L, then b

j(j) = eL by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=L)P (bi > eL) + (0:5w   bi=L)P (bi = eL)  (bi=L)P (bi < eL)
=
8<:w   eH=L; ifbi = eH0:5w   eL=L; ifbi = eL
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Thus, if w < 2(eH   eL)=L, then h(eH ; i) < h(eL; i), which means the
optimal value of bi(i) is eL. In this case, b

i (L) = eL.
2) Suppose i = L, j = H , then b

j(j) = eH by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=L)P (bi > eH) + (0:5w   bi=L)P (bi = eH)  (bi=L)P (bi < eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=L; ifbi = eH eL=L; ifbi = eL
Thus, if w < 2(eH   eL)=L, then h(eH ; i) < h(eL; i), which means the
optimal value of bi(i) is eL. In this case, b

i (L) = eL.
3) Suppose i = H , j = L, then b

j(j) = eL by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=H)P (bi > eL) + (0:5w   bi=H)P (bi = eL)  (bi=H)P (bi < eL)
=
8<:w   eH=H ; ifbi = eH0:5w   eL=H ; ifbi = eL
Thus, if w > 2(eH   eL)=H , then h(eH ; i) > h(eL; i), which means the
optimal value of bi(i) is eH . In this case, b

i (H) = eH .
4) Suppose i = j = H , then b

j(j) = eH by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=H)P (bi > eH) + (0:5w   bi=H)P (bi = eH)  (bi=H)P (bi < eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=H ; ifbi = eH eL=H ; ifbi = eL
Thus, if w > 2(eH   eL)=H , then h(eH ; i) > h(eL; i), which means the
optimal value of bi(i) is eH . In this case, b

i (H) = eH .
In summary, if w 2 [2(eH eL)=H ; 2(eH eL)=L], then the the strategy bi (i)
of worker i
bi (i) =
8<:eH ; ifi = HeL; ifi = L (7)
is the optimal response to the strategy bj(j) of worker j (j 6= i) given in Eq
(5). Therefore, the strategy combination (b1(1); b

2(2)) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the game induced by  .
By Eq(2) and Eq(7), for any ~ = (1; 2), 1; 2 2 fL; Hg,
g(b1(1); b

2(2)) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if1 > 2
(0:5; 0:5); if1 = 2
(0; 1); if1 < 2
(8)
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which implements the social choice function f(~). Q.E.D
Proposition 2: The social choice function f(~) cannot be implemented truth-
fully in a direct mechanism.
Proof: Consider a direct mechanism  direct, the timing steps of which is as
follows:
1) Each worker i = 1; 2 announces his productivity type ^i 2 fL; Hg to a
virtual mediator.
2) The mediator submits bi (^i) (i = 1; 2) to the rm:
bi (^i) =
8<:eH ; if ^i = HeL; if ^i = L
3) The rm performs the outcome function g(b1; b2), and hires the winner.
Since each worker i does not need to pay the cost bi=i when playing in the
direct mechanism, the utility function of each worker i = 1; 2 is changed from
Eq (3) to the follows:
ui(^i; ^j; i) =
8>><>>:
w; if ^i > ^j
0:5w; if ^i = ^j
0; if ^i < ^j
(9)
The utility matrix is as follows.
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L [0:5w; 0:5w] [0; w]
H [w; 0] [0:5w; 0:5w]
Obviously, the dominant strategy for each worker i = 1; 2 is to denitely
announce ^i = H , no matter what his true productivity type is. Consequently,
the social choice function f(~) cannot be implemented truthfully in a direct
mechanism. Q.E.D
3 Conclusions
From Proposition 1 and 2, we can see that:
1) In the indirect mechanism  , the utility function of each worker i = 1; 2
is given by Eq (3). It is the cost bi=i of a type i worker choosing the bid
bi that makes the strategy combination (b

1(1); b

2(2)) become a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. The cost of a worker is irrevocable even if he loses the job
competition.
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2) In the direct mechanism  direct, the utility function of each worker i = 1; 2
is given by Eq (9), where the cost disappears. Thus, each worker is free to
pretend to be a high-productivity worker without any suer. There is no way
for the direct mechanism to discriminate this counterfeit.
In summary, the revelation principle does not hold at all.
Appendix: Denitions in Section 23.B and 23.D [1]
Denition 23.B.1: A social choice function is a function f : 1  I !
X that, for each possible prole of the agents' types (1;    ; I), assigns a
collective choice f(1;    ; I) 2 X.
Denition 23.B.3: A mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) is a collection of I
strategy sets S1;    ; SI and an outcome function g : S1      SI ! X.
Denition 23.B.5: A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism in which
Si = i for all i and g() = f() for all  2 1     I .
Denition 23.D.1: The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]
for all s^i 2 Si.
Denition 23.D.2: The mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements the
social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of  , s() = (s1();    ; sI()), such that g(s()) = f() for
all  2 .
Denition 23.D.3: The social choice function f() is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if si (i) = i (for all i 2 i and i = 1;    ; I) is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism   = (1;    ;I ; f()).
That is, if for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23:D:1)
for all ^i 2 i.
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